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case, D's motion to suppress could have been granted on the basis of ownership of the
chattels seized in accordance with the ruling in the Pielow case. The court seemingly
granted it on a broader basis. The government argued that the search did not violate
D's privacy. The court answered that the two events, the search and the seizure,
"... are not capable of being viewed separately ...

."

and that the whole venture is a

violation of the constitution and therefore the evidence is to be suppressed.
It is submitted that the opinion in the instant case leaves doubt on the question as to
what persons have standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. The facts of the case
permit the interpretation that the defendant must at least have ownership of the chattels seized before the rule can be invoked. The opinion, however, tends to indicate that
the protective benefits of the rule will be granted because the constitution has been
violated regardless of whether any rights of the particular defefidant have been violated. If this is true, the exclusionary rule will have a broader application because one
of the limitations upon its use has been destroyed.
JACX J. LOBDELL

Insurance-Endowment Policy Disbursement-Testamentary or Contractual. S,
owner of a fully paid endowment life policy, elected Option 1 as a method of settlement.
This gave him a lifetime access to the principal sum and interest, the right to name
distributees for the residue, if any, at his death, but withheld the right to change the
distributees once named. P, executor of S's estate, claims the residue from D, the
insurer, contending the Option 1 agreement to be in violation of the Statute of Wills.
The trial court found for D. On appeal, Held: Affirmed. Toulouse v. New York Life
Insurance Co., 40 Wn. 2d 538, 245 P. 2d 205 (1952).
In contemplating the agreement embodied in the Option 1 settlement the court found
the distributees to be donee beneficiaries of a third party contract. The court also infers
that an exemption from the Statute of Wills is created by the section of the insurance
code permitting companies to enter this kind of agreement. RCW 48.23.300 [R.i.
Supp. 1947 § 45.23.30]. Further support is found in the decision of Mutual Ben. Life
Inmrance Co. v. Ellis, 125 F. 2d 127 (1942) wherein a seemingly testamentary disposition was held outside the Statute of Wills purely on a third-party-contract theory.
A concurring justice in the Toulouse case asserted that the decision should rest solely
on the conclusion that the contract is a valid third party donee-beneficiary contract.
So much would be a clear-cut addition to the law of third party contracts, but the
case is confused by the efforts of the majority to take the transaction out of the testamentary category on the additional theory of the passage of a present right. It finds
the passage of a present right in the vesting in the beneficiary of the mere right to
have the contract performed by the promisor (albeit that the value to the beneficiaries
might be nullified by subsequent lawful acts of the promisee). Analogy is drawn by
the court to insurance policy cases, citing Massachusetts Mit. Life Insurance Co. v.
Bank of California,187 Wash. 565, 60 P. 2d 675 (1936), which holds that vesting is an
incident of the renunciation of the right to change the beneficiary.
In the principal case the insured could have extinguished the distributee's expectancy by withdrawing the whole fund; the only right he has relinquished to them is
that of cutting them off by changing the named beneficiary while keeping the contract
extant. If such a nebulous right, presently passed, is adequate to make a disposition
non-testamentary in Washington, does this indicate a modification of the criteria for
presently passed rights necessary for testamentary dispositions? In In re Murphy's
Estate, 193 Wash. 400, 75 P. 2d 916 (1938) the court, in finding a disposition to be
void because testamentary, ignored an agreement not to sell or mortgage certain
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property leased to the beneficiary. By this agreement rights passed which were much
more substantial than that relied on in the instant case.
A fact situation similar to the principal case was encountered in Hall v. Mutual
Life Is. Co. of N.Y., 201 Misc. 203, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 646 (1952). The court recognized
a contract for the benefit of the distributee but held it invalid because testamentary
without required form, saying "The plaintiff's right, at best, arose only on.her (the
donee's) death; he had no present interest; nothing was transferred to him."
The reasoning in the Hall case is sound, but the decision, if undisturbed, would have
outlawed an institutional arrangement widely established and socially desirable.
Statutory enactment has since validated this arrangement in New York' State in
Laws of New York 1952 c.820 § 24- whereby "If a person entitled to receive payment of (a) . . . (b) money payable by an insurance company ...designates ...
a payee or beneficiary to receive payment thereof upon death of the person making
designation..., the right of theperson so designated... [is] not defeated by any
statute or rule of law governing transfer of property by will or gift or intestacy."
The Toulouse case is antithetical to the Hall case. It uses reasoning dyadic and
tenuous but reaches a result at once desirable and in accord with contemporary
custom. Legislative clarification is therefore improbable. It will remain for the Washington Supreme Court to say on 'another occasion which of the theories was the
operative one, and which one was dictum. Are all, or perhaps some, types of third
party beneficiary contracts to be considered immune from attack under the Statute
of Wills or, on the other hand, is the transfer of a mere defeasible right adequate to
make a donation non-testamentary? Perhaps this decision is best considered as a recognition of a widely used
insurance practice and should not be strained beyond its own particular fact structure.
IvoR LusTY
Corporations--Merger-Lawful Business Purpose. P,-a minority stockholder in Z
Corp., voted against a proposed agreement between Z and X Corp., whereby the shareholders of Z, in consideration of payment of $100, were to grant'an option for over
eighteen months, to purchase all shares of Z. D, a principal stockholder and director in
Z, organized Y Corp., in which D was principal stockholder and director. Y had an
authorized capitalization including both common and redeemable preferred stock. The
directors of Z and Y approved a merger agreement between the two corporations,
wherein shareholders of Z received one share of redeemable preferred stock in Y for
each of their shares of Z common. D gave all principal minority stockholders except
P an option to purchase the same number of shares of common stock in Y as they
had held in Z. The merger was approved by holders of two-thirds of the voting shares
of Z, P only dissenting. Y and X then entered an option agreement similar to the
original proposal. P seeks to set aside the merger agreement. -Judgment for D
affirmed, Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wn. 2d 286, 242 P. 2d 1025 (1952).
The court held: (a) the use of the merger device for recapitalization was not
illegal; (b) the appraisal and sale statute prescribes the exclusive remedy available to
a dissenting stockholder in merger or change in corporate structure, absent either
unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty unknown to the dissenter at the time of the
merger or change, or actual fraud.
Discussing (a), the court sought to determine whether Y was a corporation of the
kind which may emerge. The power to merge is granted in RCW 23.40.010 [RRS §
3803-42] if the corporations are formed for purposes recognized under RCW, Title
23 [RRS, Title 25], which provides that a corporation mtist be formed for "lawful

